Guardian Command Authenticity Protocol (GCAP) for Deepfake Fraud Prevention

Goal: Stop deepfake-driven fraud and data loss by making it impossible to execute high‑risk actions without cryptographic, out‑of‑band, multi‑party confirmation independent of voice/video.

Silver‑Bullet Principle: Media can inspire a request; only a signed, verified instruction can authorize it.

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Summary: Problems We Solve (explained simply)

Imagine someone uses AI to fake your boss’s face or voice. They hop on a video call, looking and sounding just like your CFO, and say: “Send $5 million to this account, right now it’s urgent.” Normally, that would trick people. But with GCAP, it fails.

To effectively combat deepfake fraud prevention, organizations must adopt stringent protocols and educate employees about the risks involved.

Why? Because we’ve built rules that say:

• Words and faces aren’t enough. A video call or email can’t move money.

  Implementing advanced technologies is crucial for deepfake fraud prevention in today’s digital era.

• Only a signed request counts. To do something important (like sending money or changing a password), the person must use a special digital key tied to their device.

• Two people must agree. Another manager, on their own device, has to check and approve the same request.

• Urgency slows things down. If someone says it’s super urgent or secret, the system automatically delays it.

So, even if a deepfake looks perfect, they can’t trick the system. They don’t have the digital keys, can’t beat the two‑person rule, and can’t rush past the cool‑down timer.

Regular training on deepfake fraud prevention helps teams recognize potential threats and respond appropriately.

Implementing proper measures for deepfake fraud prevention is critical in today’s digital landscape.

Staying updated on the latest tools for deepfake fraud prevention is essential for maintaining security.

In short: GCAP makes deepfake scams useless. Fakes can talk, but only real people with real keys can act.

Incorporating deepfake fraud prevention measures into your security framework is vital for protecting sensitive information.

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1) One‑Pager Spec (drop into your policy binder)

Scope

Applies to: wires/ACH, vendor onboarding & bank‑detail changes, credential/secrets access, data exports, production changes, contract signature, and any policy‑defined “material directive.”

Deepfake fraud prevention techniques can significantly reduce the risk of financial loss.

Non‑Negotiables

1. Signed Instruction Envelope (SIE): All material directives must be submitted as a structured JSON envelope and digitally signed by the requester with a hardware‑bound FIDO2/WebAuthn credential.

   For effective deepfake fraud prevention, ensure that all material directives are properly authenticated.

2. Two‑Channel, Two‑Brain (2C2B): A separate approver reviews the same SIE in a dedicated app and approves using their own hardware‑bound key. Threshold policy: 2‑of‑3 for irreversible actions.

3. Time‑Lock & Red‑Flag Gates: New payees, bank‑detail changes, after‑hours, or urgency language increase delay and approver count; cannot be bypassed over Zoom/email/DM.

4. Media Non‑Binding: Voice/video/email/slack is advisory only. If it isn’t a signed envelope, it isn’t a real instruction.

5. Audit‑By‑Design: Every step is logged to an append‑only audit chain (hash‑linked) with policy evaluations and public key IDs.

Minimum Controls

• Device binding + platform attestation (TPM/Secure Enclave) for signing devices.

  Utilizing vendor authenticity tokens is a proactive step in deepfake fraud prevention.

• Vendor authenticity tokens (rotating keys; signed invoice JSON/JWT; optional C2PA provenance for docs).

• Policy engine with hard blocks for risk combinations.

• Release token minted only after threshold approvals & cool‑downs have passed.

KPIs

Establishing KPIs related to deepfake fraud prevention will help gauge the effectiveness of your measures.

• 0 irreversible actions executed without SIE+2C2B.

  Auditing processes is critical for deepfake fraud prevention and ensures compliance with established protocols.

• 100% of “urgent/secret” requests paused by policy.

• Median approval latency under policy (e.g., < 2h during business hours).

• Red‑team deepfake drills: 3/3 blocked without human debate.

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2) Organization Rollout Checklist (14‑day playbook)

Day 1–2: Governance

• Adopt Media Non‑Binding policy statement.

• Define material directives + risk thresholds.

Day 3–5: Identity & Keys

• Enforce FIDO2/WebAuthn passkeys for requesters/approvers.

  FIDO2/WebAuthn passkeys are integral to enhancing deepfake fraud prevention efforts.

• Register devices with attestation; store public keys in IdP.

Day 6–7: GCAP App (MVP)

• SIE create/review/approve UI.

• WebAuthn challenge = SHA256(envelope).

  Embedding strong policies into your organization is key for deepfake fraud prevention.

• Policy engine + time‑locks.

• Append‑only audit chain.

Day 8–9: Integrations & Tokens

Integration of various systems is crucial for comprehensive deepfake fraud prevention.

• Read‑only ERP/AP sync (vendors, POs, payees).

• Issue vendor tokens (public key per vendor) and require signed invoices.

Day 10–11: Kill‑Switches

• Email/Slack banner: “To act, submit a Signed Instruction in GCAP.”

• Meeting bot posts a Trust Pause link when trigger words are heard.

Day 12–14: Validation

• Run 3 deepfake red‑team drills (CFO wire, vendor swap, data dump).

• Metrics review; tune gates; expand to more workflows.

  Regular audits facilitate effective deepfake fraud prevention and compliance.

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3) Lightweight GCAP App Step‑by‑Step Build Guide

Two tracks below: Production‑grade (Next.js/TS) and No‑/Low‑Code Pilot. Start wherever you can move fastest; the control model stays the same.

Scaffolding applications with deepfake fraud prevention in mind enhances security posture.

A) Architecture Options

• Option A (recommended): Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript, Postgres (Prisma), Auth.js (passkeys), @simplewebauthn (WebAuthn), Open Policy Agent (OPA) or custom rules, background worker (BullMQ/Queue), object storage for artifacts.

• Option B: Python FastAPI + React + Postgres + python-fido2 + Celery/Redis + OPA.

• Option C (pilot/no‑code): Retool/Glide/Stacker + SSO (IdP passkeys) + Zapier Interfaces for 2C2B + Pipedream/Make.com for time‑locks; simulate signatures with IdP‑issued JWTs and audit chain (upgrade to WebAuthn ASAP).

B) Data Model (Prisma‑style sketch)

model User { id String @id @default(cuid()) email String name String? role Role @default(MEMBER) webauthnCreds WebAuthnCredential[] devices Device[] createdAt DateTime @default(now()) }
model WebAuthnCredential { id String @id @default(cuid()) userId String user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id]) credentialId String @unique publicKey Bytea signCount Int transports String? attestationFmt String createdAt DateTime @default(now()) }
model Vendor { id String @id @default(cuid()) name String externalId String? pubKeyPem String // vendor’s rotating public key active Boolean @default(true) }
model Envelope { id String @id @default(cuid()) type EnvelopeType payload Json amount Decimal? counterparty String? reason String createdById String createdBy User @relation(fields:[createdById], references:[id]) hash String // SHA256(payload canonicalized) status EnvelopeStatus @default(DRAFT) policyScore Int redFlags String[] cooldownUntil DateTime? createdAt DateTime @default(now()) }
model Approval { id String @id @default(cuid()) envelopeId String envelope Envelope @relation(fields:[envelopeId], references:[id]) approverId String approver User @relation(fields:[approverId], references:[id]) signatureJWS String approved Boolean @default(false) createdAt DateTime @default(now()) }
model ReleaseToken { id String @id @default(cuid()) envelopeId String envelope Envelope @relation(fields:[envelopeId], references:[id]) thresholdSatisfied Boolean @default(false) serverJWS String issuedAt DateTime @default(now()) }
model Audit { id String @id @default(cuid()) envelopeId String? actorId String? event String meta Json hashPrev String hashCurr String createdAt DateTime @default(now()) }

C) Core APIs (REST example)

• POST /webauthn/register/start → challenge

  Three essential steps in deepfake fraud prevention include education, technology adoption, and policy enforcement.

• POST /webauthn/register/finish → store credential

• POST /envelopes → create SIE (server computes hash = SHA256(payload))

• POST /envelopes/:id/sign → submit WebAuthn assertion where challenge = hash; store requester signature (JWS)

• POST /envelopes/:id/policy → evaluate rules; set cooldownUntil

• POST /envelopes/:id/approve → approver WebAuthn assertion + 2 knowledge checks

• POST /envelopes/:id/release → verify threshold; mint ReleaseToken.serverJWS

• POST /vendors / POST /vendors/:id/rotate → manage vendor keys

• POST /invoices/ingest → accept only vendor‑signed JSON/JWT; verify against registry

  Vendor compliance with deepfake fraud prevention measures protects against unauthorized access.

• POST /audit → append hash‑linked records

D) Signing & Verification Flow

1. Create: User fills SIE fields → server canonicalizes JSON → computes hash.

2. Requester Sign: Browser calls WebAuthn get() with challenge = hash → send assertion + clientDataJSON → server verifies using stored public key.

   Prioritize deepfake fraud prevention in your organization’s risk management strategy.

3. Policy: Server runs policy engine; if red flags → set cooldownUntil & required approver count.

4. Approval(s): Independent approver(s) repeat WebAuthn get() over the same hash; store JWS.

5. Release: When 2‑of‑3 satisfied and cool‑down expired → server mints final Release Token (JWS) for downstream systems (ERP/AP/Secrets) to accept as authorization proof.

E) Policy Engine (examples)

Creating an environment that prioritizes deepfake fraud prevention will bolster overall security.

• Auto‑block: New payee ∧ amount > $25k ∧ after‑hours → block until next business day + Controller + CFO approvals.

• Escalate: Bank‑detail change with no prior token → require vendor phone callback via directory number and extra approver.

• Slow‑path: Any request containing urgency/secret keywords → +24h cool‑down.

F) Vendor Authenticity Tokens

• Each vendor holds a key pair (rotate quarterly). Registry stores vendor public keys.

• Invoice submitted as signed JSON/JWT:

{
  "vendorId": "v_123",
  "invoiceNo": "INV‑2025‑0912",
  "amount": 48000,
  "payTo": {"bank":"XYZ","iban":"…"},
  "poRef": "PO‑7781",
  "ts": 1758325000
}

• Transport as detached JWS or JWKS verified payload. Reject free‑text PDFs without a valid signature.

  Deepfake fraud prevention is essential for maintaining trust in digital communications.

G) Meeting “Trust Pause” Bot (pseudo)

onMeetingTranscript(chunk => {
  if (/(wire|urgent|transfer|password|IBAN|routing)/i.test(chunk.text)) {
    postChat("Reminder: Media is non‑binding. Submit a Signed Instruction Envelope in GCAP: https://gcap.internal/new");
    createAuditEvent({ event: "trust_pause_trigger", meta: {meetingId, excerpt: chunk.text.slice(0,140)} });
  }
});

H) Deployment

• App: Vercel/Fly.io/Railway/Cloudflare.

• DB: Managed Postgres (RDS/Neon/Supabase).

• Secrets: Vault/1Password SCIM/Cloud KMS.

• Queues/Timers: Redis‑backed worker or provider cron (Vercel CRON).

• Observability: Structured logs + SIEM feed; webhook to IR channel.

I) Security Hardening

• Mandatory device attestation on registration; disallow unknown platform attestation.

• Key recovery via 2‑of‑3 admin ceremony; strict break‑glass logging.

• Least privilege to ERP/AP; outbound webhooks signed and timestamped.

  Leverage technology advancements for improved deepfake fraud prevention strategies.

• Regular key rotation and vendor key expiry; alert on mismatches.

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4) No‑/Low‑Code Pilot (same model, fewer lines of code)

Goal: Prove the control works this week while the full app is being built.

• Identity: Entra ID/Okta with passkeys enabled; enforce SSO for all actors.

• UI: Retool/Glide/Stacker app for SIE creation/review using your DB (Airtable → Postgres later).

• Approvals: Zapier Interfaces or Notion + Approvals app → second approver must log in with SSO.

• Time‑Locks: Pipedream/Make.com flow that waits until cooldownUntil then calls a webhook to mint a temporary Release Token (JWT) signed by your IdP’s private key.

  Continuous improvement initiatives in deepfake fraud prevention can enhance organizational resilience.

• Audit: Append rows to an “Audit” table with hash of previous row to simulate append‑only.

• Vendor Tokens: Start with signed JSON using a per‑vendor API key/JWT; rotate monthly.

  Utilizing automated systems can streamline processes related to deepfake fraud prevention.

Upgrade path: Swap IdP‑JWT signatures for WebAuthn per‑envelope signatures when engineering completes the production app.

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5) “Build It With a Prompt” Ready‑to‑Paste Prompts

Pick a builder, paste the relevant prompt, and iterate. Keep your secrets out of prompts.

A) Vercel v0 (UI→Code for Next.js)

Prompt:
“Create a secure Next.js (App Router, TypeScript) admin app named GCAP that implements a Signed Instruction Envelope workflow: SIE create/review pages, passkey (WebAuthn) registration and assertion using Auth.js, Postgres via Prisma, API routes for /envelopes, /approve, /release, policy engine stubs, and an audit log page. Use server actions where appropriate and generate clean components with accessibility. Include a simple rules panel for red‑flag gates and a countdown until cooldownUntil.”

B) Replit Agent (full‑stack generation)

Prompt:
“Build a full‑stack TypeScript GCAP app: Next.js front end + Node API routes + Postgres (Prisma). Implement WebAuthn passkeys (@simplewebauthn), SIE JSON canonicalization + SHA256 challenge, 2‑of‑3 approval flow, time‑locks, and a signed Release Token (JWS). Provide seed scripts and a Dockerfile. Include basic unit tests for signature verification and policy gates.”

C) StackBlitz bolt.new (instant project)

Prompt:
“Scaffold a minimal GCAP demo with a SIE form, WebAuthn registration/login, and an approval screen. Use vanilla WebAuthn + a lightweight Node server that verifies assertions and stores envelopes in memory. Show the full signing flow end‑to‑end.”

D) GitHub Copilot Workspace / Cursor

Prompt:
“Create a GCAP monorepo with Next.js app, packages/policy (rules), packages/crypto (WebAuthn helpers, JWS), Prisma schema, and CI checks. Implement endpoints and pages for create → sign → approve → release, plus unit tests. Target Node 20.”

Incorporating deepfake fraud prevention practices into development cycles is crucial for modern security.

E) Pipedream (workflow glue)

Prompt:
“Create a workflow named GCAP‑cooldown: when a webhook receives {envelopeId, cooldownUntil}, sleep until that timestamp, re‑fetch the envelope, verify approvals ≥ threshold, then POST to /release with a signed JWT using Pipedream’s private key.”

F) Framer AI (landing page only)

Prompt:
“Design a one‑page GCAP landing with the message: ‘Media is non‑binding. Sign before you act.’ Include hero, how‑it‑works (3 steps), and compliance logos.”

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6) Tabletop Drill Script (20 minutes)

Scenario 1 – Deepfake CFO Wire

• Inject: ‘CFO’ on Zoom requests $2.8M urgent wire. Email follows.

• Expected outcome: Team refuses; creates SIE; policy adds cool‑down; requires 2‑of‑3 approvals; vendor token verified; funds only release after timer.

Scenario 2 – Vendor Bank Swap

• Inject: PDF invoice with new routing.

• Expected: Rejected (no vendor signature); vendor callback via directory; issue new token.

Scenario 3 – HR Data Dump

• Inject: Voice call asks for W‑2 export.

• Expected: Rejected; HR requires SIE + 2C2B + DPO approval.

Pass criteria: All three blocked without relying on media analysis; only signed, policy‑approved instructions proceed.

By focusing on deepfake fraud prevention, organizations can safeguard their assets and reputation.

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7) Acceptance Criteria (Definition of Done)

• 100% of material directives flow through SIE → 2C2B → Release Token.

• All downstream systems (ERP/AP/Secrets) accept only Release Tokens.

• Append‑only audit chain validates against hash integrity checks.

• Red‑team drills pass; incident runbook updated; metrics tracked weekly.

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Notes & Pitfalls

• WebAuthn signs a challenge; make the challenge the SIE hash to bind signature to content.

• Don’t ship passkeys without device attestation and key provenance.

• Treat detection (deepfake filters) as advisory. The control is authorization design.